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Abstract
Several game theoretical topics require the analysis of hierarchical be-
liefs, particularly in incomplete information situations. For the problem of
incomplete information, Harsa´nyi suggested the concept of the type space.
Later Mertens & Zamir gave a construction of such a type space under
topological assumptions imposed on the parameter space. The topological
assumptions were weakened by Heifetz, and by Brandenburger & Dekel.
In this paper we show that at very natural assumptions upon the struc-
ture of the beliefs, the universal type space does exist. We construct a
universal type space, which employs purely a measurable parameter space
structure.
1 Introduction
Modeling rationally behaving actors in a multi-person decision problem involves
the analysis of players’ information about all aspects, which have influence on
the decision making. During the decision making process the rational players
use all available information, so its analysis is necessary for modeling the actors’
behavior. Aumann[1] introduced a formal definition for the idea of common
knowledge. The distinction between common knowledge and knowledge leads
to, among others, the research of hierarchies of beliefs.
The problem of incomplete information is related to the problem of hierar-
chical beliefs. In an incomplete information situation, some parameters of the
model are not common knowledge. If something is not common knowledge, we
must deal with hierarchies of beliefs, that is, we have to consider arguments like
what every agent believes about what every agent believes about what every
agent believes and so on, which makes the model very complicated.
Harsa´nyi[3] assumed a ready-made type space, which includes all possible
types of players, and hence, their knowledges, beliefs as well. Simultaneously he
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assumed a probability measure, defined on the product of the parameter space
and the type spaces. This probability measure induces hierarchies of beliefs,
so we can consider this probability measure as a ”summary of hierarchies of
beliefs”. However, the opposite question remains: how can we build a type
space from hierarchies of beliefs?
A very important step in this direction was made by Mertens & Zamir[10]
who built a universal type space based on a compact parameter space. Later,
Heifetz[4] relaxed the compactness, but other topological assumptions were re-
tained. Almost parallel Brandenburger & Dekel[2] proved the existence of a
universal type space in presence of a complete, separable metric (Polish) pa-
rameter space. More recently, Mertens & Sorin & Zamir[9] gave an elegant
proof for the existence of a universal type space in cases of parameter spaces
with various structures. Ultimately, all of the above proofs are based on the
Kolmogorov’s Existence Theorem and its generalizations.
In 1998 Heifetz & Samet[5] proved the existence of a universal type space,
which possesses a purely measurable structure. In contrast to our paper, the
authors make a distinction between universal type space, and space of coherent
hierarchies of beliefs. They also gave an illuminating discussion on the problem
of type spaces, beliefs spaces. The same authors gave a counterexample showing
that in general circumstances, coherent beliefs are not always types (see Heifetz
& Samet[6]).
Quite recently, Meier[8] investigated the problem of the existence of a univer-
sal type spaces, his model is based on finitely additive measures. By regarding
the opinions as finitely additive measures, the problem of existence of σ-additive
measures on type spaces can be eliminated. On the other hand, the author dis-
cusses how “rich” the structure of a universal type space can be. This work
brings to the surface that, the problem of existence of σ-additive measures on
type spaces is not only the problem of σ-additivity.
Mertens & Zamir[10], Heifetz[4], Brandenburger & Dekel[2], and Mertens &
Sorin & Zamir[9] use the concept of projective limit for proving the existence of a
universal type space. In all four papers the structure of beliefs is inherited from
the topology of lower ranked beliefs spaces or the parameter space, moreover
beliefs are modeled by compact regular probability measures.
Our main goal is to build a universal type space, that is apparently “purely
measurable”, and in which every coherent hierarchy of beliefs is a type. The
structure on the beliefs is naturally generated by the Baire sets of the point-
wise convergence topology. For metric spaces Baire sets and Borel sets coincide.
However, in non-metrizable cases (for instance when the cardinality of the play-
ers is greater than countable), our approach results in a weaker then Borel
structure, but this structure allows the players to distinguish between any pair
of beliefs (i.e. regular probability measures) yet.
An other new idea in this paper is that we cut the parameter space off the
beliefs space. This truncated space has a sufficiently good topological structure
(i.e. a projective system of completely regular topological spaces), so the measure
projective limit exists. After this, we re-fit the parameter space to the measure
projective limit, and we construct the universal type space. It is clear that
the existence of a measure projective limit crucially depends on topological
assumptions. However, if we remove finitely many elements of the projective
system of measure spaces, it does not influence the existence of the measure
projective limit.
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In the next section we build up our model. In section 3, we prove the main
result of our paper, finally, in section 4 an illustrative example is provided.
2 The Model
If something is common knowledge, then everybody knows that, everybody
knows that everybody knows that, and so on. So, common knowledge is more
than knowledge, it is some kind of knowledge that is the strongest knowledge in
the situation. If something is common knowledge, then somebody’s knowledge of
this fact does not influence the situation. If something is not common knowledge,
then the rational players must concern with the beliefs of other players, beliefs
about beliefs of other players and so on.
Therefore, if we have a parameter space S, and this includes all parameters of
the game, then we are about to construct a space generated by S, that includes
all reasonable beliefs, beliefs about beliefs and so on. This space is called the
beliefs space.
Definition 1 The parameter space is a measurable space (S,AS), where AS is
a σ-algebra defined on S.
This space S contains all parameters, which have impact on the game. We
assume only measurability on this space. The players think in ideas like prob-
ability, events, thus a purely measure theoretic model seems to be adequate.
However, as is well known from Heifetz & Samet[6], a purely measure theoretic
universal type space does not exist in our context.
Definition 2 Let ∆(S,AS) denote the space of the probability measures on
(S,AS), and put d(µ1, µ2) = supA∈AS |µ1(A) − µ2(A)|. Then (∆(S,AS), d)
or briefly (∆, d) is a metric space. The collection of all Baire sets of (∆, d) is
denoted by B(∆, d).
If it will not lead to misunderstanding, instead of ∆(S,AS) we use the shorter
notation ∆(S) or simply ∆. Analogously, B(∆(S), d) is replaced by B(∆(S)).
Definition 3 Let us define a sequence of spaces recursively, where M stands
for set of the players:
T0 = (S,AS)
T1 = T0 ⊗ (∆(T0)M , B(∆(T0)M ))
T2 = T1 ⊗ (∆(T1)M , B(∆(T1)M )) =
T0 ⊗ (∆(T0)M , B(∆(T0)M ))⊗ (∆(T1)M , B(∆(T1)M ))
...
Tn = Tn−1 ⊗ (∆(Tn−1)M , B(∆(Tn−1)M )) =
T0 ⊗⊗n−1j=0 (∆(Tj)M , B(∆(Tj)M ))
...
where ⊗ denotes the product measurable structure.
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A point in T0 is called parameter value, simply a parameter of the game. A
point in T1 is a combination of a parameter value and a 1-st order beliefs (the
players’ beliefs on the parameter values), and so on.
Consider the infinite product T∞ = S × ×∞j=0∆(Tj)M . If t ∈ T∞ then it
has the form t = (s, µ11, µ
2
1, . . . , µ
1
2, µ
2
2, . . .), where µ
i
j means the ”i” player’s j-
th order belief. So, every element of T∞ describes an hierarchy of beliefs i.e.
(µi1, µ
2
i , . . .) for all players and a possible parameter, therefore it is a possible
state of the world. We call beliefs space the spaces of type of T∞.
Definition 4 Fix an i ∈ M . A hierarchy of beliefs (µi1, µi2, . . .) is coherent if
n ≥ 2
• margTn−2µin = µin−1
• marg[∆(Tn−2)]iµin = µiµin−1 ,
where µin is taken from [∆(Tn−1)]
i (which is the i-th copy of ∆(Tn−1)), further-
more, margTn denotes the marginal distribution on Tn, and µ
i
µin−1
stands the
Dirac measure concentrated on the ”point” µin−1.
The first condition declares the fact that the beliefs over some aspects of
the game do not change in the hierarchy. The second condition states that the
players know exactly their own beliefs (cf. Harsa´nyi[3]). These two conditions
describe the ”logic” of the players, we assume this logic to be common knowledge.
Remark 5 The measurable structure on [∆(Tn−1)]i ∀i, n is defined by the Baire
sets, which coincide with Borel sets in the case of metric spaces, hence any
singleton is measurable.
Consider an element (s, µ11, µ
2
1, . . . , µ
1
2, µ
2
2, . . .) from T∞ such that the hier-
archies of beliefs (µi1, µ
2
i , . . .) are coherent for every i ∈ M . The set all those
elements is denoted by T c∞ and called the coherent subspace of T∞. (The super-
script c will be used in the same context throughout the paper.)
Definition 6 Fix an i ∈M and set
T i = (×∞k=0[∆(T ck )]i)c.
T i is called the type space for player i. A point in T i is a possible type of player
i.
The type space of player i consists of all coherent hierarchies of beliefs. In
particular, if t ∈ T i, then t = (µi1, µi2, µi3, . . .), and t is coherent.
Corollary 7 T i is metrizable since it is a subspace of a countable product of
metric spaces. This metric is given by dp(µ, µ′) =
∑
n
1
2n d(µn, µ
′
n) where µ, µ
′ ∈
T i, and µn, µ′n ∈ [∆(T cn−1)]i (d is given in Definition 2).
Remark 8 If the cardinality of M is more than countable, then the Baire struc-
ture of ∆(Tn)M is weaker than the Borel structure. On the other hand, this
structure (Baire sets) coincides with ⊗m∈MB(∆(Tn))m the product measurable
structure. It is worth noting that our construction very similar to a purely mea-
surable type space, because no topology is used to make a stronger measurable
structure for product spaces.
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Corollary 9 For a given i ∈M ,
((T cn, B(T
c
n), µ
i
n+1), prmn|m≤n) (1)
is a measure projective syste, where prmn is the coordinate projection from T cn
to T cm, and (µ
i
1, . . . , µ
i
n+1, . . .) ∈ T i.
Proof. For the definition of projective systems we refer to M. M. Rao[11]
p. 117.
• prmn = prmk ◦ prkn ∀m < k < n, by the definition of coordinate projec-
tions.
• prnn = idT cn ∀n follows from the definition of coordinate projections.
• prmn is measurable ∀m < n, because of the definition of product measur-
able spaces.
• µin+1(pr−1mn(A)) = µim+1(A) ∀m < n and ∀A ∈ B(T cm) is a consequence of
the coherency of beliefs.
The above Corollary establishes the connection between the idea of projec-
tive system and beliefs space. The main question is that, whether or not a
proper projective limit of the above defined system exists.
3 The main result
Before we take the next step, we clarify the role of Baire sets in our model. In
Mertens & Zamir[10], the opinions were modeled by regular probability mea-
sures on Borel sets of a compact space. However, if there is a compact regular
probability measure on the Baire sets of a topological space, then it can uniquely
be extended to the Borel sets as a compact regular measure. So, there is one-
to-one correspondence between compact regular probability measures on Baire
sets and on Borel sets. In conclusion, regular probability measures are com-
pact regular measures on a compact topological space hence, there is a bijection
between opinions in Mertens & Zamir[10] and opinions in our model.
In Brandenburger & Dekel[2], the opinions are compact regular probability
measures on the Borel sets of a Polish (separable, complete, metric) space. As
is well known, Borel sets and Baire sets coincide in the case of metric spaces,
and all regular probability measures on Borel sets of a Polish space are compact
regular. Therefore, the opinions in Brandenburger & Dekel[2] and the opinions
in our model are related the same way as Mertens & Zamir[10] and our model,
respectively.
In Heifetz[4], and Mertens & Sorin & Zamir[9] the opinions are compact reg-
ular probability measures on different kinds of spaces. According to our previous
discussion, all compact regular probability measures on Borel sets are regular
probability measures on Baire sets, but there may be regular probability mea-
sures on Baire sets, which are not necessarily compact regular. In an informal
way we may say that the set of opinions in our model is, in a certain context
broader than that in Heifetz[4], or Mertens & Sorin & Zamir[9].
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As we have seen, the collection of Baire sets is essentially smaller than the
collection of Borel sets if the cardinality of M is more than countable. In
this case, a point is not measurable in T cn n > 0 space. We can interpret this
phenomenon as the players’ inability of knowing what the others’ beliefs exactly
are. The players can concentrate on countably many players’ beliefs only. We
often meet the following argument: ”I don’t know who, but I’m sure somebody
believes that ....!”. In the language of probability theory: ”Mr. X believes that
....” is the outcome, ”somebody believes that ...” is the event. In this example,
we mean that the players cannot make an argument like ”Mr. i believes that
..., Mr. j believes that ..., ” for all players, but our players can argue that ”Mr.
1 believes that ..., Mr. 2 believes that ..., ..., somebody believes that ...”. This
feature of our model is a typical pure measure theoretic feature.
In the next proposition we show that, the central question in our model is
the σ-additivity of µi in the weak measure projective limit (definition of weak
measure projective limit is given in the Appendix).
Proposition 10 Let i ∈ M be fixed. A unique weak measure projective limit
(T,AT , µi) = w − lim←−((T
c
n, B(T
c
n), µ
i
n+1), prmn|m≤n) of the measure projective
system (1) exists. Further, T = T c∞, AT is a field and µi is an additive set
function on AT .
Proof. The proof essentially follows the ideas of Rao[11] p. 118.
Since every prmn is a coordinate projection we deduce that T is not empty
and T = T c∞. Pick an A ∈ AT , then there is an index n, and B ∈ B(T cn), A =
p−1n (B). Moreover, if B ∈ B(T cn), then also {B ∈ B(T cn), so {A = p−1n ({B) ∈
AT . If A1, ...., Am ∈ AT , then for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m there exists an index nj
such that Aj = p−1nj (Bj). Let k be the maximal element of {n1, ..., nm}, and
let Kj = p−1njk(Bj), we know Kj ∈ B(T ck ) ∀j, so ∪jKj ∈ B(T ck ). Making use of
Aj = p−1k (Kj) we obtain ∪jAj ∈ AT . Thus, AT is an algebra.
Since every pnm is a coordinate projection, we conclude that pn is onto.
This implies that p−1n is one-to-one. Therefore, the set function µ
i defined by
the equality µi ◦ p−1n = µin is uniquely defined.
Take A1, ...., Am ∈ AT disjoint sets, then ∪jAj ∈ AT . For each 1 ≤
j ≤ m select Bj and Kj as above. We know Kjs are disjoint, and therefore,∑
j µ
i
k+1(Kj) = µ
i
k+1(∪jKj), and
∑
j µ
i(Aj) =
∑
j µ
i(p−1k (Kj)) =
∑
j µ
i
k+1(Kj)
= µik+1(∪jKj) = µi(∪jp−1k (Kj)), hence µi is finitely additive ∀i.
Proposition 1 concentrates on the additivity of µi. Generally, the problem of
existence of a proper measure projective limit is twofold: the first problem is the
”richness” of the projective limit set (Heifetz & Samet[6] address this problem),
the second is the problem of σ-additivity of µi. We use the idea of coordinate
projections in the projective system, which ensures that the projective limit set
is ”rich” enough. The second problem demands regularity.
In the next proposition, we take preliminary steps for proving our main
result.
Proposition 11 Let us define the following sequence of truncated spaces (c.f.
Definition 3):
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C0 = (∆(T0)M , B(∆(T0)M )
C1 = C0 ⊗ (∆(T1)M , B(∆(T1)M )) =
(∆(T0)M , B(∆(T0)M ))⊗ (∆(T1)M , B(∆(T1)M ))
...
Cn = Cn−1 ⊗ (∆(Tn−1)M , B(∆(Tn−1)M )) =
⊗n−1j=0 (∆(Tj)M , B(∆(Tj)M ))
...
Consider the measure projective limit (which is unique):
(C,AC , νi) = lim←−((C
c
n, B(C
c
n), ν
i
n), prmn|m≤n),
where νin = margCcnµ
i
n+2 is compact regular. Then ν
i is σ-additive for every
i ∈M .
Proof. The proof based on M.M. Rao[12] p. 357-358.
Let i ∈M be fixed and arbitrary.
The preceding proposition tells us that AC is a field, and νi is an additive
set function on it for each i. Furthermore, AC ⊂ B(C) because all pn are
continuous with respect to the product topology on C (which is the weakest
topology for which all pn are continuous).
Since the topological product of completely regular spaces is completely
regular, it follows that C enjoys complete regularity. It is not hard to verify
that νi is inner regular set function.
The completely regular topological spaces are characterized by the fact, that
they can be embedded into a compact space as a dense set (Cˆech-Stone com-
pactification). Let I be the one-to-one function, which embeds C into a K
compact space, and let νiK = ν
i ◦ I−1 be a set function on AK , the subsets of
K, which are defined by AK = {X ⊆ K|I−1(X) ∈ AC}. The direct corollary
of this definition that, νiK is inner regular, therefore (inner) compact regular as
well.
As is well known, if an additive set function is compact regular, then it is
σ-additive as well. Hence, νiK is σ-additive. On the other hand, C contains the
support of νiK , and ν
i is the restriction of νiK on C, hence ν
i is σ-additive as
well.
Consequently, νi is σ-additive on AC ∀i.
Remark 12 The role of compact regularity in the proofs of existence theo-
rems of measure projective limit is twofold. First, compact regularity ensures
σ-additivity. On the other hand, every compact regular measure can uniquely be
extended from the product measurable structure to Borel sets. This later proves
to be very important in the case of stochastic processes (the measurability of
the sample function), but it is not relevant in our problem. We do not want to
introduce events into our model that cannot be deduced directly by probabilistic
logic.
The next theorem is our main result.
Theorem 13 T i is a universal type space, so there exists a homeomorphism
f : T i → (∆(AT ), τp), where (∆(), τp) means the pointwise convergence topology
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on ∆(), and ∆() denotes the set of probability measures, of which the marginal
on C is compact regular probability measure.
The proof of the theorem is basically divided into two parts.
Definition 14 Let g : ∆(AT ) → T i that associates with every measure µ a
point t = (µi1, µ
i
2, . . . , µ
i
n, . . .) in T
i, where
µin = margTn−1µ
for every integer n.
Lemma 15 Let (M,AM , µM ), (N,AN , µN ) be probability measure spaces, and
let µ be an additive set function on AM ⊗ AN , and let pM and pN denote the
coordinate projections. If µ ◦ p−1M = µM and µ ◦ p−1N = µN , then µ is σ-additive
on the field A generated by the cylinder sets.
Proof. It is easy verify that every element of A has the form ∪jMj × Nj ,
where j <∞, Mj ∈ AM , Nj ∈ AN . It is well known ([7]) that, µ is σ-additive
on A iff for a sequence An+1 ⊆ An, ∩nAn = ∅ =⇒ limn→∞ µ(An) = 0. For every
finite intersection ∩nAn = ∪j(Mj ×Nj), for a finite set of indices j. Therefore,
if the countable intersection ∩nAn = ∅, then the corresponding Mj × Nj = ∅.
Let us divide the setsMj×Nj into two groups. Let the first group contain those
products Mj ×Nj where Mj = ∅, and let the second contain the others. Let us
take the union of the members of the first group, it has the form ∅ × (∪jNj).
Similarly, the union of the elements of the second group can be expressed as
(∪jMj)× ∅. We have µ(∅ × (∪jNj)) = µ((∪jMj)× ∅) = 0, from the additivity
of µ, µ(∅ × (∪jNj)) + µ((∪jMj)× ∅) = µ(∅), which implies limn→∞ µ(An) = 0,
hence µ is σ-additive on A.
Lemma 16 g is a bijection.
Proof. First we show that g is injective. If µ ∈ ∆(AT ) is given, then µ
determines its marginals, in other words, it determines a unique point in T i.
Now we verify that g is onto. Let a point t ∈ T i be given. From Proposition
10 and 11 we have that AS ×AC ⊂ AT . Let us define q1 : (T,AT ) → (S,AS),
and q2 : (T,AT )→ (C,AC) as coordinate projections. Define µ on the cylinder
sets by the equalities:
µ = µi1 ◦ q1, and µ = νi ◦ q2
(see Definition 3 and Proposition 11). On the cylinder sets, µ and µi coincide
(µi is taken from the projective limit, see Proposition 10) and µi is an additive
set function, hence we can extend µ to the field generated by the cylinder sets,
in the way that, µ and µi coincide on this field. From Lemma 15 µ is σ-additive
set function on this field, so it can be extended uniquely onto AT . We prove
that µ = µi on AT . Indeed, if there were an A ∈ AT with µ(A) 6= µi(A), then
there would exist a k, and B ∈ B(T ck ) such that A = p−1k (B). We know µik+1 is
σ-additive, hence µ = µi on T ck , which is a contradiction. Thus, g is a bijection.
Definition 17 Set f = g−1.
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Lemma 18 f is a homeomorphism.
Proof. f is continuous (tk
dp→ t =⇒ f(tk) p→ f(t)): tk dp→ t means ∀l, ∀Al ∈
B(T cl ) t
l
k(Al) → tl(Al), moreover p−1l (Al) ∈ AT , and f(tk) ◦ p−1l (Al) = tlk(Al),
hence f(tk)
p→ f(t) on AT .
f−1 is continuous (µk
p→ µ =⇒ f−1(µk) dp→ f−1(µ)): µk p→ µ on AT , which
means the marginals of µk converge to µ pointwise, so f−1(µk)
dp→ f−1(µ).
Proof. of the Theorem Let f be defined by Definition 17.
From Lemma 16, f is a bijection.
From Lemma 18 f is a homeomorphism.
Remark 19 We proved the homeomorphism for AT , but not for σ(AT ), because
the homeomorphism is not valid in the latter case. Our theorem can be extended
to the σ(AT ), if the structure of σ(AT ) is induced by the pointwise convergence
topology on AT .
Remark 20 This Theorem shows the importance of pointwise convergence topol-
ogy. If T is a topological space, then the weak or weak* topology is weaker then
our structure on ∆(σ(AT )).
4 Conclusion
The main advantage of this model comes from the pointwise convergence topol-
ogy on beliefs, that is independent of the topology of the original space. This
space is a completely regular topological space, so we can use Kolmogorov’s
Existence Theorem in a general form (Proposition 2, Theorem 1).
Let us see an example for the usage of this model.
Example 21 Let there be two players, every player has two strategies. This
game in normal form is a point in R8. There are two random variables, which
determine the payoffs of the players. Therefore, the parameter space: S = R8R
2
(the parameters are functions from R2 to R8). S is not compact, nor Polish,
so Mertens & Zamir’s and Brandenburger & Dekel’s construction do not work
in this case. Let the measurable structure of S be the Borel sets of S. In
our model, the opinions are the probability measures on S, but these are not
necessarily compact regular, so Heifetz’s, Mertens & Sorin & Zamir’s models
are less general, than ours.
It seems that, our model performs better, than the previous ones. On the
other hand, recently, Simon[13] showed that, there may be problem with the
existence of measurable equilibrium of the games with incomplete information.
Hence, a model, in which , the beliefs of the players are modeled by probability
measures, is not necessarily appropriate for some problems.
We think the existence of measurable equilibrium is out of the scope of our
paper, hence we refer to this problem as an open problem in general, so in the
case of our model as well.
9
5 Appendix: Definition of weak measure pro-
jective limit
We define the idea of weak projective limit of measure spaces for completeness.
Definition 22 Let ((Mn,Mn, µn), (I,≤), pmn|m≤n) be a projective (inverse)
system, where (Mn,Mn, µn)s are measure spaces, pmns are the measurable pro-
jections, and I is a directed set. The weak measure projective limit of
((Mn,Mn, µn), (I,≤), pmn|m≤n)
is
(M,M, µ) = w − lim←−((Mn,Mn, µn), (I,≤), pmn|m≤n),
where
• prn : ×nMn →Mn coordinate projection,
• pn = prn|M ,
• M = {ω ∈ ×nMn|prm(ω) = pmn ◦ prn(ω), ∀m < n ∈ I},
• M = ∪nΣn, where Σn = {p−1n (A)|A ∈Mn},
The main difference between weak measure projective limit and measure
projective limit is that, µ must be σ-additive in the later case.
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